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twenty years, liable for the wrong committed, the court opened the
door to retaliation from or friction between a foreign government and
the United States? It would seem that the above questions must be
answered in the negative, and in support thereof one should recognize
each of the factors considered by the court in Hellenic Lines Limited.
The protection of the rights of seamen, as well as the rights of
competing American shipowners and resident alien shipowners, demand the result reached by the court in Hellenic Lines Limited. Shipowners who are resident aliens and shipowners who are United States
citizens should be subject to the same liabilities for injuries suffered
by their employees on their vessels, particularly when the vessels are
at United States piers. If a United States shipowner is liable under the
Jones Act to a foreign seaman serving on a foreign registered vessel
injured in our territorial waters, a permanent resident alien should
also be liable.
Raul Garcia
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To JUDGMENT. Hollins v. Rapid Transit Lines, Inc., 440 S.W.2d
57 (Tex. Sup. 1969).
Hollins, joined by her husband, filed a personal injury suit against
Rapid Transit Lines, Inc. claiming that she had been injured while a
passenger on defendant's bus. Plaintiff then amended her petition to
include a cause of action alleging that defendant, in anticipation of
being held liable, fraudulently conveyed substantially all of its assets
to another transit company after the accident. The trial court severed
and granted summary judgment for defendant on the fraudulent conveyance action on the ground that a plaintiff's tort suit must be reduced
to judgment prior to his seeking to set aside the alleged fraudulent
transfer. The granting of summary judgment for the defendant was
affirmed by the court of civil appeals,1 and the Texas Supreme Court
granted writ of error. Held-Reversed and cause ordered reinstated.
A tort claimant may seek to set aside fraudulent conveyance prior to
reducing his claim to judgment.
The action to set aside a conveyance by a debtor in fraud of his
creditors has long been recognized as a valid restriction on an individual's right to dispose of his property in the manner in which he desires. 2
1 Hollins v. Rapid Transit Lines, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1968, writ granted).
2 37 AM. JUR. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances § 1 (1968).
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This right is based on the theory that. since the creditor has a claim
against his debtor, he has a right to have the claim satisfied out of his
debtor's property.3 Therefore, any transfer with the intent to hinder,4
delay, or defraud the creditor is inequitable and should not be allowed.
Every state allows some form of fraudulent conveyance action,
and most, including Texas, have statutes based on the early English
common law fraud statutes of 50 Edw. III, c. 6 (1376) and 13 Eliz. I,
c. 5 (1570). 5 Approximately twenty states have adopted the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Statute which specifically allows the holder of
an unliquidated claim to maintain an action under the statute. 6 In
1967, Texas chose not to adopt the uniform statute but revised and
reenacted articles 3996 through 3999 into chapter 24 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Section 24.02, the article upon which the
instant case is based, is essentially a reenactment of article 3996. In
order to have a conveyance set aside as a fraud on a creditor, it must be
proved that the debtor transferred certain property with the intent to
defraud his creditors,7 that the creditors were or will be hindered,
delayed or defrauded 8 and that the transferee had knowledge of the
debtor's intent." A bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge of
the fraud is protected under the statute.' 0 Badges or circumstances
which are evidence of fraud include secrecy," failure to record,' 2 close
relationship of parties, 13 pendency of suits against the grantor,1 4 transfer without delivery, 15 and conveyances between husband and wife' 6 or
other closely related members of the family.' 7 Lack of consideration in
a voluntary conveyance is covered by section 24.03.18
The defrauded creditor must resort to court action before he will be
30cklawaha River Farms Co. v. Young, 74 So. 644 (Fla. 1917).
41d.
5 37 AM. JUR. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances § 3 (1968).
6 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,

1918; 37 AM. JUR. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances § 3 (1968).
7 Cates v. Clark, 24 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930, writ ref'd).
8 Rivera v. White, 94 Tex. 538, 63 S.W. 125 (1901); Couger v. Costello, 10 S.W.2d 746
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1928, no writ).
9 Blum v. McBride, 69 Tex. 60, 5 S.W. 641 (1887); Belt v. Texas Co., 204 S.W.2d 653
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Life Insurance Co. v. Goldberg,
184 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Vaco 1944, no writ).
10 Hamm v. Drew, 83 Tex. 77, 18 S.W. 434 (1892); Snyder v. Roberts, 13 Tex. 598 (1855).
11.Edmundson v. Silliman, 50 Tex. 106 (1878).
12 Matula v. Lane, 56 S.W. 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ).
13 Reynolds v. Lansford, 16 Tex. 287 (1856); Tinsley v. Corbett, 66 S.W. 910 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1902, writ ref'd).
14 Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326 (1846); Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48 (Tex.
Sup. 1964).
15 Boltz v. Engelke, 43 S.W. 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ).
16 Byrd v. Taylor, 40 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1931, writ dism'd).
17 Howard v. Bolin Warehouses, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967,
no writ).
18 Snow v. Harding, 180 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944, writ ref'd
W.o.m.).
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entitled to recover property fraudulently conveyed 9 because the transfer is not void, but only voidable at the option of the person protected
by the statute. 20 Depending on the circumstances, he may elect between
two remedies. 21 One holding a judgment lien against a debtor may
cause execution to be issued under the judgment and levy on the property conveyed without necessity of a separate suit. 22 Until the creditor
has a right to levy on the property by execution or attachment or has
a judgment which he may have abstracted, his only remedy is an action
in equity for a decree annulling the conveyance as a fraud and a hindrance in the collection of the amount due to him. 23
Although it is usually a creditor, i.e., one who actually loans money
to a debtor and later has problems in collection of the amount due,
who takes advantage of the fraudulent conveyance statute, the law
has long recognized that persons other than true creditors are protected by the statute. The language quoted by Justice Smith in this
case of first impression in Texas, "Upon common-law principles, however, one who at the time a transfer of property is made has a right to
recover damages in tort may avoid the transfer as fraudulent if the
transfer is made for the purpose of defeating his right," was first set
forth in the case of Fox v. Hills,2 4 an 1815 Connecticut case that interpreted the common law and that set a course that was followed in
several other cases 25 in that state including the Murphy case 26 cited by
the Texas court. These cases were based on the English statute of 13
Eliz. I, c. 5 (1570), which was an embodiment of the common law of
England at the time of its enactment 27 and stated in substance that a
conveyance in fraud of creditors or other persons is null and void
against such creditors or other persons. In the case of Corry v. Shea,28
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, an interpretation of the Wisconsin
statute 29 and the statute of 13 Eliz. I on which it was based, led the
court to hold that "protection extends not only to creditors but to all
others who have a cause of action or suit and embraces claims for
3
slander, trespass and other torts.' 0
19 Stockbridge v. Crockett, 38 S.W. 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ).
20 Rilling v. Schultze, 95 Tex. 352, 67 S.W. 401 (1902); Hollis v. Hollis, 226 S.W.2d 129
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, writ dism'd).
21 Rutherford v. Carr, 66 Tex. 101, 87 S.W. 815 (1905).
22 Snow v. Harding, 180 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944, writ ref'd
w.o.m.); American Employers Insurance Co. v. Davis, 153 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1941, no writ).
23 Eckert v. Wendel, 120 Tex. 618, 40 S.W.2d 796 (1931), noted in 76 A.L.R. 855 (1931);
see also Texas Sand Company v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
24 Fox v. Hills, 1 Conn. 295 (1815).
25 White v. Amenta, 148 A. 345 (Conn. 1930); De Feo v. Hindinger, 120 A. 814 (Conn.
1923).
26 Murphy v. Dantowitz, 114 A.2d 194 (Conn. 1955).
27 GRIFFITS, CREDITORS' BILLS, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS, p. 157 (McKnight ed. 1963).
28 128 N.W. 892 (Wis. 1910).
29 WISCONSIN STATUTES OF 1898 § 2320. (W.S.A. c. 242).
30 Corry v. Shea, 128 N.W. 892 (Wis. 1910).
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The Wisconsin statute is very similar to the original Texas Fraudulent Conveyance Statute of 1840. 3 1 However, although it is stated that
this early Texas statute is based on the statute of 13 Eliz. 1,32 the Texas
version did not include the words "or other persons" but applied only
to creditors per se. 3 3 In the Revised Civil Statutes effective July 24,
1879, article 246534 was enacted as a revision of article 3876, and the
legislature added the words "or other persons" to the statute, bringing
it almost exactly in line with the statute of 13 Eliz. I, the Wisconsin
statute, and the decisions by the Wisconsin and Connecticut courts.
Relying on article 2465 and its later reenactments, Texas courts have
held that one having a valid tort claim and demand for unliquidated
damages may be a creditor entitled to protection under the fraudulent
conveyance statute. 35 These cases dealt with actions brought after
judgment on the claim. The plaintiffs sought to avoid the general rule
that a subsequent creditor cannot attack a prior conveyance of which
he had notice at the time he became a creditor. 36 Although these cases
have mentioned that there must be a judgment in order to maintain the
action to set aside the conveyance, the facts of the cases showed that a
judgment was in existence, and the necessity of obtaining a judgment
prior to maintenance of the action was not in issue. Even though the
question had not been presented prior to the instant case, since 1879
the Texas Fraudulent Conveyance Statute, by the inclusion of the
words "or other persons," seems to have allowed a claimant with unliquidated damages to maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance prior to obtaining a liquidated demand by judgment. The
wording of the latest revision, 37 section 24.02, allowing the action to
be maintained when the transfer was intended to defraud "interested
persons of that to which he is or may become entitled" seems to clearly
allow a claimant, in the event he should think it necessary, to file suit
and obtain a judgment to set aside the conveyance prior to a final
judgment being rendered in the tort suit.
A logical step from holding the tort claimant to be a creditor would
be to allow him to maintain a fraudulent conveyance action at any
time after his cause of action accrues. In the majority of the states in
31 TEX. LAWS 1840, An Act to Prevent Frauds and Fraudulent Conveyances § 2; 2
H. Gammel, LAWS OF TEXAS 202 (1898).
82 Bryant v. Kelton & Uzzell, 1 Tex. 415 (1846).
33 TEx. LAWS 1840, An Act to Prevent Frauds and Fraudulent Conveyances § 2, 2
H. Gammel, LAWS OF TEXAS 202 (1898).
34 TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 2465 (1879).
35 Cole v. Terrell, 71 Tex. 549, 9 S.W. 668 (1888); Holden v. McLaury, 60 Tex. 228
(1883); Colby v. McClendon, 116 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, no writ);
Robertson v. Hefley, 118 S.W. 1159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ).
36 Lehmberg v. Biberstein, 51 Tex. 457 (1879); Collier v. Perry, 149 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1941, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
37 TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.02 (1968).
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which this question has been raised, the courts have taken the position
that their statutes were broad enough to include tort claimants as
creditors. While many of these states have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Statute which specifically allows a tort claimant
with an unliquidated claim to maintain an action,3 8 in 1963 the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, under a statute 39 which purports to cover
only creditors, reversed an earlier case 40 and allowed an action by a
tort claimant prior to judgment. 41 In this case the court reasoned that
since, in the case of Mclnnis v. Wiscassett Mills, 28 So. 725 (a case much
like Colby v. McClendon, supra), the tort claimant had been held to be
a creditor within the protection of the statute, it was within the letter
and spirit of the law to allow the fraudulent conveyance action prior
to judgment as well as after judgment. In 1964, the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed the earlier case of Pennell v. Walker,42 and held that
the statute43 currently in force included a tort claimant within its
protection and the claimant could bring the action prior to judgment.
A review of the cases in the sixteen states that comprise the majority
indicates that all the holdings have been based on the principle that
the state statute included a tort claimant in addition to one having a
tort judgment as a party entitled to protection.
46
Four states support the minority view. 44 In California, 45 New Jersey,
and Washington, 47 there appear to be no cases exactly on point, but
the courts, when writing on other subjects, have recognized the rule
that a judgment must be taken prior to seeking to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. This rule appears to be based on the 1861 United
States Supreme Court case of Adler v. Fenton48 where the Court held
that, in the absence of special legislation, a general creditor cannot
bring action against his debtor prior to the debt becoming due. This
was an action for tortious interference with collection of a debt and
seems to be quite different from a suit to set aside a conveyance. In
addition, the objection of the Supreme Court in the Adler case is clearly
overcome in Texas by the statute's allowing "other interested persons"
to maintain actions of fraudulent conveyance.4 9 In Rhode Island the
Federal Court of Appeals, First Circuit, held that an injunction would
38 UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT,

39 MISSISSIPPI CODE OF

1942, § 265.

1918

§

1.

40 Jones v. Jones, 30 So. 651 (Miss. 1901).
41 Allred v. Nesmith, 149 So. 2d 29 (Miss. 1963).
42 36 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio 1941).
43 Of-o REVISED CODE, tit. 13 § 1336.01 (1964).
44 73 A.L.R.2d 749 (1931).
45 Chalmers v. Sheehy, 64 P. 709 (Cal. 1901).
46Washington Nat. Bank v. Beatty, 76 A. 442 (N.J. 1910); Boid v. Dean, 21 A. 618 (N.J.
1891).
47 Allen v. Kane, 140 P. 534 (Wash. 1914).
48 65 U.S. 407, 16 L. Ed. 696 (1861).
49 TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24 (1968).
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not issue to prevent the fraudulent transfer of property in a personal
injury action, 50 However, in that suit the plaintiff failed to allege fraud
on defendant's part. It would seem, therefore, that there is no solid
minority position or reasoning against allowing a tort claimant to
maintain a fraudulent conveyance action prior to judgment.
It should be noted that in the Connecticut case, 51 cited by the Texas
Supreme Court in the instant case, it was held that plaintiff could join
her tort action with her fraudulent conveyance action and try both at
the same time. Although usually it would be best to join the actions
and dispense with both claims at once (unless the jury would be
adversely influenced against the defendant by hearing evidence on the
conveyance), section 24.0252 seems to clearly allow the fraudulent conveyance action to be tried first. This might be an advantage to a plaintiff
because the sooner the conveyance is set aside, the less likely a creditor
of the transferee or a bona fide purchaser will enter the picture and
eliminate the plaintiff's chance to recover the property. Although it
seems that the defendant may still obtain a severance of the two causes
of action, 53 as in the instant case, the severance seems to be less advantageous because the fraudulent conveyance action would not be subject
to dismissal but could be tried prior to the tort action.
The Naumovich case,5 4 distinguished by the supreme court as not
on point, is still authority for the rule that a temporary injunction
from another court will not issue to enjoin the sale of property in
fraud of a creditor. It would seem logical to allow an injunction to prevent a fraudulent transfer if a suit to set aside the transfer is to be
allowed as soon as the sale is complete. Other states do not seem to
distinguish between the two remedies, and with the blended system
of law and equity in Texas, the court will probably allow this once
the point is presented.
Justice Walker, in his concurring opinion,5 5 points out that the
court's only holding is that the trial court erred in dismissing the suit
to set aside. However, it would seem that a plaintiff interested in
cancelling a fraudulent conveyance before his tort suit was tried could
certainly rely on the instant case and bring a cancellation action at any
time after his cause of action arose and the alleged fraudulent conveyance was made.
William H. Bingham, Jr.
5O Martin v. James B. Berry Sons Co., 83 F.2d 857 (Ist Cir. 1936).

51 Murphy v. Dantowitz, 114 A.2d 194 (Conn. 1955).
52 TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. (1968).
53 TEx. R. Clv. P. 41.
54 Naumovich v. Reese, 247 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no writ).
.55 Hollins v. Rapid Transit Lines, Inc., 440 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex. Sup. 1969).
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